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Abstract—Today, many wireless device providers choose to sell devices bundled with complementary mobile social services, which
exhibit strong positive network externality. Taking a reverse engineering approach, this paper aims to quantify the benefits of selling
devices and complementary services under the following three strategies: separate pricing, bundled pricing, and hybrid pricing (both
the separate and bundled options are offered). A comprehensive comparison of the above three strategies is carried out for two
popular service models, namely physical connectivity sharing and virtual content sharing, respectively. These two sharing service
models are two popular examples under the emerging trend of sharing economy. We first study the physical service model where the
provider (e.g., FON) offers users customized WiFi devices for indoor Internet access, and allows service subscribers to physically
access all device owners’ WiFi when traveling. Observing that all device-owners contribute to the connectivity sharing, we show, via a
Stackelberg game theoretic approach, that bundled pricing outperforms separate pricing as long as the total cost of device and service
is reasonably low to stimulate network externality. Further, hybrid pricing strictly dominates bundled pricing thanks to the pricing
flexibility to keep high marginal profit of device-selling. Next, we investigate the virtual sharing service model where the provider (e.g.,
Apple) sells devices and device-supported applications. Different from the connectivity service model, in this model service subscribers
directly contribute to the virtual content sharing, and the network externality can be fairly strong. We prove that hybrid pricing
degenerates to bundled pricing if the network externality degree is larger than the average device valuation, which is in stark contrast
with the connectivity service model in which hybrid pricing always outperforms bundled pricing.
Index Terms—Mobile social services, network externality, bundled pricing
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, mobile social services are becoming amain driver for a wireless device provider’s revenue
growth. Different from traditional social services, mobile
social services are enabled by new wireless devices and
allow users to share physical wireless connectivity or virtual
content with each other. For example, FON company1 not
only sells WiFi routers for mobile Internet access at home
but also introduces a WiFi sharing service for global con-
nectivity by aggregating users’ WiFi connectivity. It offers
members access to more than 35 million crowdsourced WiFi
hotspots in 1000 cities at the end of 2016 [1]. Similarly, Apple
provides wearable iWatch devices and promotes new virtual
applications (e.g., Activity and Health, for users’ measuring,
planning and sharing fitness and health activities). These
new social applications exhibit strong positive network ex-
ternality among users and helped the iWatch sales hit 12
million units in 2015 [2]. We shall consider two types of
mobile social services, namely physical connectivity sharing
and virtual content sharing service models. In the first
service model, the physical sharing service’s value to a user
depends on the number of device-owners who contribute to
the device-supported service, and a user at a time is either
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using indoor home device or outdoor service. In contrast, in
the virtual sharing model, application/service users alone
generate content and contribute to the service value, which
is independent of device value. The above two sharing
service models are two popular ones under the emerging
trend of sharing economy. Indeed, as users are provided
with a community platform to efficiently share connectivity
or information with unprecedented ease, the potential of
a sharing economy is huge. A recent report by Ericsson
Consumer Lab indicates that as many as three-quarters of
smartphone owners are interested in this sharing platform
[3].
FON, OpenSpark and Whisher are the pioneers in
launching the physical sharing model, stimulating the wire-
less sharing economy among users and providing global
WiFi connectivity beyond home coverage [4]. Such mobile
social services among users are enabled by secure sharing
devices (e.g., Fonera routers for FON’s case) and require
central coordination and management [5]. For example, to
become a FONmember, one needs to purchase a customized
WiFi router called Fonera, which enables users to share
WiFi bandwidth and access keys with each other. Other
companies such as OpenSpark [6] and Whisher [7] follow
a similar sharing business by including residential and even
portable WiFi routers. Many of these providers including
FON have chosen to use bundled pricing to sell the device
and complementary social service as a package [8]. This is
intriguing and has motivated us to ask the first key question
in this paper: why does a profit-maximizing provider prefer
bundled pricing over separate pricing when providing the
physical sharing service, and how is the pricing choice
affected by the device and service costs?
2In the second service model, many new wearable de-
vices, such as iWatch and Samsung Gear, support Health
and Fitness application services that enable users to easily
monitor heart rate or track physical exercises in real time
[9]. By generating and sharing massive content (e.g., heart
beats, fitness milestones and locations), users build strong
social ties with each other. Unlike the physical sharing
model, in this context users are flexible to use the device
and virtual applications at any time, and the service users
directly contribute to the social service’s network externality.
Moreover, the applications are no longer attractive to users
without owning wearable devices and separate pricing does
not work in this model. Given the two options of bundled
pricing and hybrid pricing, we observe that the provider
always prefers to bundle popular service applications (e.g.,
Activity app and Fitness app in iWatch) with devices;
whereas some less popular services (e.g., Runtastic, Golfshot
Pro and Golfplan in iWatch) are not necessarily bundled
and users can buy devices only. This motivates us to ask
the second key question: under which conditions should
the provider bundle the content sharing service with device
selling and skip providing device-only option?
To answer these two key questions, we study the optimal
pricing choices for both service models. Our main contribu-
tions are summarized as follows.
• A quantitative analysis of bundled pricing for device-
supported mobile social services: To our best knowledge,
this is the first paper to study the bundled pricing for
emerging wireless devices and complementary mo-
bile social services with positive network externality.
In Section 2, we formulate the interactions between
provider and heterogeneous users as a Stackelberg
game: In stage I, the provider determines to adopt
which pricing strategy (separate, bundled or hybrid
pricing); In stage II, a user decides which product
to buy based on his utilities, while taking into con-
sideration the other users’ decisions due to positive
network externality.
• Separate versus bundled/hybrid pricing for connectivity
sharing services: In Section 3, we analyze provider’s
optimal pricing strategy by considering device-
owners’ contribution to the physical sharing service.
It is shown that bundled pricing outperforms sepa-
rate pricing as long as the total device and service
cost is reasonably low to stimulate network exter-
nality. Hybrid pricing strictly dominates bundled
pricing thanks to the pricing flexibility to keep high
marginal profit of device-selling. Moreover, we show
that the service cost is more critical than the device
cost to affect the pricing choice.
• Bundled versus hybrid pricing for content sharing ser-
vices: In Section 4, we analyze the provider’s optimal
pricing strategy by comparing the bundled pricing
against the more general hybrid pricing, where ser-
vice users directly contribute to the service value.
Unlike the physical connectivity sharing model with
comparable device and service values (for indoor
and outdoor usages), here the service value is in-
dependent of device value and can be fairly large.
Different from the connectivity service model in
which hybrid pricing always outperforms bundled
pricing, the provider is more likely to sell the device
and service as a bundle as the degree of network
externality λ increases. To be specific, hybrid pricing
degenerates to bundled pricing once the network
externality degree is larger than the average device
valuation.
We have a few words on related work, most of which
focuses on pricing of either wireless devices or services
without considering the bundling, not to mention the net-
work externality for mobile social services (e.g., [5], [10],
[11]). The work [12] discusses how to decide the price for
a single type of good allocation (e.g., snow blower) which
not only benefits the buyers allocated with the public good
but also their neighbors under network externalities. The
work [13] further studied the auction design for provision-
ing the single type of good under incomplete information
and network externalities. Different from these two works,
our study here focuses on two related types of goods (de-
vice and the device-supported service) for bundled pricing.
While in recent economics models which consider bundled
pricing or network externality (e.g., [14], [15], [16], [17],
[18]), their results for independent products cannot apply
to our device-supported mobile social service models. The
works [19], [20], [21] study the pricing design under multi-
providers’ competition. Note that they only study a single
type of good’s pricing instead of two related types of goods
with network externality in our paper. Still, we can imagine
some intuitive results of pricing competition hold for our
device-supported mobile social service model. For example,
providers may differentiate in their pricing choices to avoid
severe competition. As users’ subscription decides the net-
work coverage, we also expect providers to differentiate in
their equilibrium coverage for provisioning different QoS.
We plan to study multi-provider bundled pricing formally
in the future. In this paper, we study the optimal pricing
schemes for both connectivity and content sharing service
models in the spirit of sharing economy, in which the device-
supportedmobile social services exhibit network externality.
We compare the provider’s optimal profits, under three
pricing strategies, namely separate pricing, bundled pricing
and hybrid pricing, and characterize the conditions under
which we can take advantages of service bundling.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a monopoly provider who sells devices and com-
plementary mobile social services to users, where users are
heterogeneous in their valuations for device and service.
The user population is normalized to be one unit. Due to
the network externality, the quality of service (QoS) Q(Ds)
increases with the number of users Ds contributing to the
network externality, where Ds ∈ [0, 1]. More details on
Ds will be presented for the two different models later. A
particular user’s valuations for the device and the service
are denoted asR1 and f(Q(Ds)), respectively. Two different
users’ valuations for device or service may be different.
In separate pricing, the provider sells the device and
service separately, and the utility of a user for buying the
device only is
U1 = R1 − p1, (1)
3Fig. 1: System model of the two service models
and his utility for buying the service only is2
U2 = f(Q(Ds))− p2, (2)
where p1 and p2 are the device and service prices, respec-
tively.
The user will buy the device if U1 ≥ 0 and the service
if U2 ≥ 0. Given users’ valuation distribution and network
externality, we aim to derive the users’ demands D1 and
D2 ∈ [0, 1] for the device and service, respectively. The
provider’s total profit under separate pricing is
Πs(p1, p2) = (p1 − c1)D1 + (p2 − c2)D2, (3)
where c1 and c2 are the unit costs of the device and service,
respectively.3
In bundled pricing, the provider sells the device and
service as a bundle, and the subscribing user’s utility is
U12 = R1 + f(Q(Ds))− p12. (4)
where p12 is the bundled price.
Users will buy the bundle product if the utility U12 ≥
0. It follows that the provider’s total profit under bundled
pricing is
Πb(p12) = (p12 − c1 − c2)D12, (5)
where D12 ∈ [0, 1] is the demand for the bundle product.
More generally, the provider can choose hybrid pricing
by providing both the separate and bundled options. For
example, if the provider offers device-only and bundled
products to users with prices p1 and p12, the provider’s total
profit under hybrid pricing changes from (3) and (5) to
Πh(p1, p12) = (p1 − c1)D1 + (p12 − c1 − c2)D12. (6)
Next, we specify the device valueR1 and the social value
f(Q(Ds)) for two different device-supported mobile social
service models, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
2. In the physical sharing service, a user has his own phone or laptop
to use the service only option. However, the content sharing service
should be supported by a wearable device and service-only option is
not attractive to users.
3. Our cost model can be extended to further include the one-time
cost (e.g., for server deployment) for setting up the social service
infrastructure. As long as the profit of service justifies the service cost,
the service is finally provided and the one-time cost does not affect the
pricing.
• In the physical sharing service model, heterogeneous
users split their time at home and outside differently.
We denote a user’s mobility factor as α ≤ 1, and
1 − α means his time proportion at home. Here,
α is different for different users corresponding to
their different mobility patterns or habits. As all pur-
chased devices (e.g., Fonera routers for FON’s case)
contribute to the network externality by default, Ds
is the number of device buyers (e.g., D1 in separate
pricing and D12 in bundled pricing) and Q(Ds)
represents the outdoor WiFi coverage by aggregating
all devices’ connectivity. Thus, we reasonably assume
R1 = 1 − α for Internet access benefit at home and
f(Q(Ds)) = αQ(Ds) for outdoor Internet access
benefit, depending on both mobility and the outdoor
WiFi coverage. The device and service values are
comparable and we bound both values by value 1.
• In the virtual sharing service model, it is service sub-
scribers instead of all device owners that contribute
to the network externality, and users are flexible to
use the device and service at any time. A user’s
time occupancies in the device and service are no
longer complementary. A particular user’s valuation
for the device is denoted as R1 ∈ [0, θ¯], where θ¯
tells the maximum possible value one associates to
the local device usage (e.g., time watching, calendar
management, and web browsing). Different from the
physical sharing service model, in this case service
users generate and share content themselves and
Ds is the number of users subscribing to the so-
cial service. We assume a general valuation model
for the service including an intrinsic service value
R2 ∈ [0, 1] (e.g., heart beat monitoring in Health app)
and an external social value λQ(Ds) (e.g., sharing
heart beats in the same app), where λ is the degree
of network externality that is higher for popular
sharing service. The total service value to a user is
f(Q(Ds)) = R2 + λQ(Ds). Note that in the physical
sharing model, a user gets access to at most one WiFi
hotspot at home or outside at a time and the physical
connectivity sharing service’s value is bounded by 1.
However, the virtual sharing service’s value here is
independent of device value and can be reasonably
large, telling users’ flexibility to generate and share
massive content with each other.
In both service models, we formulate the two-stage
interactions between the provider and users as a Stackel-
berg game. In Stage I, the provider determines the pricing
strategy and the corresponding price profile to maximize
its profit. In Stage II, the users decides whether and which
option to buy based on his device and service utilities as
well as the other users’ decisions due to network externality.
We will use backward induction to first analyze users’ equi-
librium purchase at Stage II for any given pricing strategy
and then the provider’s optimal pricing strategy at Stage I
by taking into consideration the users’ best responses.
In the following, we will analyze the optimal pricing
choice for the physical sharing model in Section 3 and then
for virtual sharing model in Section 4. The generalization of
our models and results is discussed in Section 5.
43 OPTIMAL PRICING FOR PHYSICAL CONNECTIV-
ITY SHARING SERVICES
In the physical sharing model, service quality Q(Ds) is
intimately related to the total WiFi coverage and increases
with the number of device buyers. Generally, service quality
Q(Ds) (in term of total service coverage) increases quickly
when Ds is small and slowly when Ds is large. This is
because the access points can be densely distributed for
large Ds, which results in overlap WiFi coverage [22]. Thus,
we set the service quality as
Q(Ds) = D
γ
s , (7)
where γ ≤ 1 measures the service quality sensitivity. The
small γ captures the case where the service quality increases
very quickly at the beginning and then very slowly. For
analysis tractability, we consider the case of γ = 1 and
Q(Ds) = 1 tells a full coverage through the WiFi sharing.
Later in Section 3.3 we will also investigate the general
γ distribution using simulations. For a user with mobility
factor α ∈ [0, 1], 1 − α is his local benefit for using home
device only. By subscribing to the social service, the user re-
ceives the service benefit αDs. The mobility factor α ∈ [0, 1]
is assumed to follow uniform distribution. For example, a
housewife who stays home mostly perceives α = 0, while a
salesman who travels frequently perceives α = 1 as in [21].
Our results can be extended to normal distribution for user
mobility without major change of engineering insights (see
Section 5.2.1 for details). In the following, we will analyze
users’ behaviors and the provider’s profits under separate
pricing, bundled pricing and hybrid pricing, respectively.
3.1 Separate Pricing for Connectivity Sharing Services
Under separate pricing, the provider sells the device and
service separately. Given separate prices p1 and p2, for a
user with mobility factor α, the utility function for buying
the device is
U1(α) = 1− α− p1, (8)
which is derived from (1) by letting R1 = 1− α.
His utility for buying the service is
U2(α) = αD1 − p2, (9)
which derived from (2) by letting f(Q(Ds)) = αD1. As Ds
is the number of device buyers, we have Ds = D1, which is
not given but depends on all users’ decisions on buying the
device. The separate pricing should satisfy 0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1.
Otherwise, all users receive negative payoffs and will not
subscribe to device or service.
In the following, we use backward induction to first ana-
lyze the users’ equilibrium decisions for any given separate
pricing (p1, p2) in Stage II, and then analyze the provider’s
optimal separate pricing design in Stage I.
Lemma 3.1. Users of low mobility will buy the device
for intense home WiFi usage, whereas those with high
mobility will buy the service for intense outdoor usage.
In particular, the equilibrium demand for the device is
D∗1(p1) = 1− p1, (10)
and the equilibrium demand for the service is
D∗2(p1, p2) = 1−
p2
1− p1 . (11)
Proof: It is clear that users with U1(α) ≥ 0 will purchase
the device, telling that α ≤ 1 − p1. According to (9), given
any D1, a user will buy the complementary service if α ≥
p2
D1
. Since α ∈ [0, 1] follows uniform distribution, we have
D∗1(p1) = 1 − p1, and users with α ≥ p21−p1 will buy the
service, i.e., D∗2(p1, p2) = 1− p21−p1 .
Note that if γ in (7) is less than 1, the equilibrium de-
mand for the device is the same as (10) but the equilibrium
demand for the service changes from (11) to D∗2(p1, p2) =
1− p2(1−p1)γ .
Equation (11) tells how the device buyer population con-
tributes to the service value. As p1 increases, the number of
device-owners D∗1 decreases in (10) and the the aggregated
WiFi coverage or service quality decreases. Thus we expect
a smaller demand D∗2 in the service. We also notice that
D∗2 ≥ 0 only if p1 + p2 ≤ 1. After determining the users’
equilibrium demands D∗1 and D
∗
2 in Stage II, we are ready
to study Stage I by choosing optimal (p1, p2) to maximize
the profit, i.e.,
max
0≤p1,p2≤1
Πs(p1, p2) = (p1−c1)D∗1(p1)+(p2−c2)D∗2(p1, p2).
(12)
Note that 0 ≤ c1, c2 ≤ 1 for the device and service costs,
otherwise, the provider will not offer the device or service
in the first place. Problem (12) is a non-convex optimal
problem as the objective is not concave in p1. Despite of this,
we are still able to derive the optimal solutions in closed-
form by examining the profit objective’s relationship with
p1 and p2 in different feasible regions.
Proposition 3.1. Under the separate pricing strategy, the op-
timal device price p∗1 and service price p
∗
2 are determined
as follows:
• If the social service is finally provided, the optimal
device price p∗1 is the minimal solution of
3
4
− 2p1 + c1 + c
2
2
4(1− p1)2 = 0. (13)
The optimal service price p∗2 is decreasing in p
∗
1 and
is given by
p∗2 =
1 + c2 − p∗1
2
. (14)
• If the social service is not provided due to high costs,
the optimal device price is
p∗1 =
1 + c1
2
. (15)
The resulting device-only profit is
Π1(p
∗
1) =
(1− c1)2
4
. (16)
The proof of Proposition 3.1 is given in Appendix A.
We have a few remarks on the relationship between p∗1 and
p∗2 when the social service is provided. As the device price
increases, fewer users will buy the device and contribute to
the network externality of the service. This leads to a less
valuable service and a lower service price.
5(a) c1 = 0.05, c2 = 0.05
(b) c1 = 0.05, c2 = 0.2
(c) c1 = 0.3, c2 = 0.2
Fig. 2: Illustration of users’ choices under optimal separate pricing (p∗1 , p
∗
2) when
the social service is provided (c1 + 2c2 ≤ 1)
To determine when the service is finally provided, we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. If c1 + 2c2 ≤ 1 with 0 ≤ c1, c2 ≤ 1, the
provider offers both device and service at the optimal
separate pricing.
According to Corollary 3.1, we can see that both c1 and c2
affect the provision of service. As c1 increases, p
∗
1 increases
and the device demand D∗1 in (10) decreases, leading to a
smaller network externality to justify the service provision.
After analyzing the whole two-stage game, as an illustra-
tive example, Fig. 2 depicts how users’ equilibrium choices
are finally affected by costs c1 and c2 when the service is
provided. In Fig. 2(a), c1, c2 are small, and some users buy
both device and service due to affordable device and service
prices. Fig. 2(b) shows that not only the service demand D∗2
decreases but also the device demand D∗1 decreases as ser-
vice cost c2 increases. This is because that the service is less
profitable and it is costly to maintain a high device demand
for supplying high network externality of the service. As
the device cost c1 increases, Fig. 2(c) shows service demand
decreases as fewer device-owners under higher device price
contribute to the service’s value.
3.2 Bundled Pricing for Connectivity Sharing Services
and Pricing Comparison
Under bundled pricing, the provider sells the device and
service as a bundle. Given bundle price p12, for a user with
mobility factor α, the utility function for buying the bundle
package is
U12(α) = (1− α) + αD12 − p12, (17)
which is derived from (4). Here all subscribers buy the
device (i.e., Ds = D12). We require p12 ≤ 1, otherwise, all
users received negative payoffs and will not subscribe.
Equation (17) tells that a user’s decision is affected by the
other users’ decisions D12. Letting U12(α) ≥ 0, only users
with α ≤ 1−p121−D12 will subscribe to the service. Then we have
D12 =
1− p12
1−D12 , (18)
which has two roots. Note that if γ < 1, the equilibrium
demand changes from (18) to D12 =
1−p12
1−Dγ
12
.
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Fig. 3: Comparison between bundled pricing and separate pricing for connectivity
sharing service
The profit-maximizing provider prefers to choose the
larger root as the equilibrium demand, i.e.,
D∗12(p12) =
1 +
√
4p12 − 3
2
. (19)
We will discuss how to make the users choose the larger
root later.
Recall that in Stage I, the provider’s objective is
max
0≤p12≤1
Πb(p12) = (p12 − c1 − c2)D∗12. (20)
Note that c1 + c2 ≤ 1, otherwise, the profit received
by the provider is negative and the bundle product is not
provided. By solving problem (20), the provider’s optimal
bundle pricing is as follows.
Proposition 3.2. Under the bundled pricing strategy, the
optimal bundle price is the maximum p∗12 = 1 and all
users are still included (D∗12 = 1). The resulting profit is
Πb(p
∗
12) = 1− c1 − c2. (21)
The proof is given in Appendix B.
In reality, the unit cost of the service c2 should not
be very small due to the infrastructure and maintenance
fee [23]. To rule out some trivial cases, in the following,
we consider c2 ≥ 0.05. By comparing the optimal profits
under separate pricing and bundled pricing strategies in
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.1. The provider prefers bundled pricing over
separate pricing if
(1− c1)(3 + c1)
4
> c2. (22)
Otherwise, the provider chooses separate pricing.
Notice that the left-hand-side of (22) is decreasing in
c1. Fig. 3 shows that if the total device and service cost is
small, the bundled pricing outperforms the separate pricing
as it stimulates strong network externality. If device cost
c1 is high, bundled pricing aiming to stimulate network
externality has lowmarginal profit of device-selling. Thus, it
is better to choose flexibly separate pricing to charge a high
device price. If service cost c2 is high, the marginal profit
of service-selling is low and it is not worthwhile to sacrifice
6device-selling profit for network externality of the service.
From Fig. 3, we can also see that the service cost c2 is more
sensitive than the device cost c1 to decide the optimal pric-
ing choice. Intuitively, as the service is device-supported,
the bundled pricing sacrifices some device-selling profit and
must be justified by high marginal profit of service-selling
or low service cost.
3.3 Hybrid Pricing for Connectivity Sharing Services
and Pricing Comparison
As shown above, separate pricing has the flexibility to
charge device and service differently, whereas bundled
pricing can stimulate strong network externality for the
device-supported service. It is natural to ask if there is a
pricing strategy which can take advantages of both pricing
strategies. In this subsection, we consider the case when
the provider offers device-only and bundle options simul-
taneously. Users who purchase the device-only or bundle
options contribute to the WiFi coverage, i.e.,Ds = D1+D12.
Given the device prices p1 ∈ [0, 1] and bundle price
p12 ≥ p1, the utility of a user for buying the device is given
in (8) and the utility for buying the bundle package is
U12(α) = (1− α) + α(D1 +D12)− p12, (23)
which is equivalent to the case that the user will separately
pay another price p12− p1 to obtain the service after paying
the device.
Lemma 3.2. A user makes equilibrium decisions in Stage II
according to his mobility factor α:
• If 0 < α ≤ min(1 − p1, p12−p1D1+D12 ), then the user will
buy the device only.
• If p12−p1
D1+D12
≤ α ≤ min(1, 1−p121−D1−D12 ), then the user
will buy the bundle to further benefit from the ser-
vice.
Proof: A user with mobility factor α ≤ 1−p1 has U1 ≥ 0
and will purchase the device. The user will further buy the
social service if U12 > U1 or simply α ≥ p12−p1D1+D12 . Then we
conclude that the user with 0 < α ≤ min(1 − p1, p12−p1D1+D12 )
will buy the device only. When α ≥ p12−p1
D1+D12
and U12 ≥ 0,
the user will buy the bundle. That is, p12−p1
D1+D12
≤ α ≤
min(1, 1−p121−D1−D12 ).
It should be noted that some users of high mobility α
and negative device-only benefit (i.e., U1(α) < 0) may still
subscribe to the bundle. This is because the social service
benefit is large enough to justify the negative device-only
utility.
According to Lemma 3.2, the equilibrium demand D∗1
for the device satisfies
D1 = min(1− p1, p12 − p1
D1 +D12
), (24)
and the equilibrium demand D∗12 for the bundle product
satisfies
D12 = min(1,
1− p12
1−D1 −D12 )−
p12 − p1
D1 +D12
. (25)
Note that if γ in (7) is less than 1, the equilibrium
demand for device-only changes from (24) toD1 = min(1−
p1,
p12−p1
(D1+D12)γ
), and the equilibrium demand for the bundle
product changes from (25) to D12 = min(1,
1−p12
1−(D1+D12)γ )−
p12−p1
(D1+D12)γ
.
By solving (24) and (25) jointly, we can derive the equilib-
rium demands D∗1(p1, p12) and D
∗
12(p1, p12) as functions of
p1 and p12. By substituting them back to analyzeΠh(p1, p12)
in (6), we have the following optimization result.
Proposition 3.3. The optimal hybrid pricing decides p∗1 =
1 − c22 and p∗12 = 1 to include all users in the market.
The equilibrium device demand and bundle demand are
such that D∗1 + D
∗
12 = 1 with D
∗
1 =
c2
2 , D
∗
12 = 1 − c22 .
The resulting optimal profit is
Πh(p
∗
1, p
∗
12) = 1− c1 − c2 +
c22
4
, (26)
which is strictly larger than the profit of bundled pricing
in (21).
The proof is given in Appendix C. According to Propo-
sition 3.3, the optimal device price p∗1 decreases with service
cost c2. Intuitively, as c2 increases, to keep marginal profit
of service selling high, the provider should stimulate more
device buyers and stronger network externality, motivating
a smaller device price p∗1. By comparing bundled and hybrid
pricing in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3, the hybrid and bundled
pricing have the same p∗12 = 1. But for those users D
∗
1 pur-
chasing device-only in hybrid pricing, the marginal profit
of device-selling p∗1 − c1 = 1 − c1 − c22 is higher than the
bundled pricing’s uniform marginal profit 1 − c1 − c2. It is
not efficient to serve users of low mobility and incur service
cost.
By further comparing the profit of hybrid pricing against
that of separate pricing, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.2. Among three pricing choices, the provider
prefers to adopt hybrid pricing if
c1 + c2 ≤ 1.
Otherwise, the provider chooses the separate pricing.
With strict improvement from bundled pricing, hybrid
pricing outperforms separate pricing in a larger (c1, c2) area
by comparing Figs. 3 and 4 when γ = 1. Unlike bundled
pricing, the hybrid pricing still offers service when c2 is
high (even close to 1), as the provider can efficiently include
device-only buyers to help support service value. When
both device cost c1 and service cost c2 are high, the separate
pricing outperforms the hybrid pricing as the provider can
flexibly cease to provide the costly service and provides
device-only option. Fig. 4 further shows that when γ < 1,
hybrid pricing still outperforms separate pricing in low
costs area. As γ increases (from 0.2 to 0.5 and then to 1) and
the service quality Q(Ds) increases more quickly with large
Ds, hybrid pricing outperforms separate pricing even in the
high device cost area. With high device cost and small γ, the
provider can choose to sell less devices without damaging
the service quality due to the slow increasement of network
effect and service quality.
4 OPTIMAL PRICING FOR CONTENT SHARING
SERVICES
Different from the connectivity sharing service model, in the
content sharing service model, service subscribers in a social
7(a) High price regime θ¯ + λD12 < p12 <
θ¯ + 1 + λD12
(b) Medium price regime 1 + λD12 < p12 <
θ¯ + λD12
(c) Low price regime λD12 < p12 < 1 + λD12
Fig. 5: Demand analysis for bundled pricing in the content sharing service model
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app/service directly contribute to the network externality
and users are flexible to use device and service at any time.
We assume a linear service quality function Q(Ds) = Ds to
model one’s gain from the others’ virtual content sharing.
As explained in Section 2, a user’s device and service
valuations are respectivelyR1 and R2+λDs, where λ is the
degree of network externality and can be reasonably large.
This is different from the bounded network externality in
the physical connectivity sharing model with comparable
device and service values (for indoor and outdoor usages).
We assume the device value R1 and service’s intrinsic value
R2 independently follow uniform distributions in [0, θ¯] and
[0, 1], respectively. Our results can be extended to normal
distribution for bothR1 andR2 without major change of en-
gineering insights (see Section 5.2.2 for details). Practically,
a user attaches a larger value to device like iWatch than the
service’s local benefit. In the following, we focus on the case
when θ¯ ≥ 1, though our analysis method also works for the
other case.
As the content sharing services are no longer attractive
to users without wearable devices, separate pricing does
not work in this section. In the following, we study the
provider’s profit maximization under the left bundled and
hybrid pricing strategies.
4.1 Bundled Pricing for Content Sharing Services
Under bundled pricing, the provider only offers a bundle
price p12 for both the device and service. In the content
sharing service model, the users who buy the bundle prod-
uct contribute to the service’s QoS, i.e., Ds = D12. By
substituting f(Q(D12)) = R2 + λD12 into (4), the utility
of a user with particular device and service valuations (R1
and R2) is
U12 = R1 +R2 + λD12 − p12. (27)
The equilibrium demand D∗12 depends on the bundle
price p12. If p12 ≥ θ¯ + 1 + λD12, no user will subscribe to
the bundle product. In the following, we divide the analysis
for non-trivial p12 < θ¯+1+λD12 into three cases as shown
in Fig. 5.
In high price regime (θ¯+ λD12 < p12 < θ¯+ 1+ λD12 or
simplyD12 <
1
2θ¯
), the users’ subscription and their demand
are shown in Fig. 5(a). A normalized unit mass of users are
uniformly distributed in the whole square [0, θ¯]× [λD12, 1+
λD12] with area θ¯. By calculating the area of the equal-right
triangle, the equilibrium demand can be derived from
D12 =
(θ¯ − (p12 − 1− λD12))2
2θ¯
. (28)
From (28), we can show p12 as a unique function of
demand D12, that is
p∗12(D12) = θ¯ + 1 + λD12 −
√
2θ¯D12. (29)
Substitute it to profitΠb = (p12−c1−c2)D12, the provider’s
optimization problem in Stage I is
max
D12
Πb(D12) = (θ¯ + 1 + λD12 −
√
2θ¯D12 − c1 − c2)D12.
The objective above is a concave function of D12, and by
checking the first-order condition, we obtain the equilibrium
demand as
D∗12 =
8(θ¯ + 1− c1 − c2)2
(3
√
θ¯ +
√
9θ¯ − 16λ(θ¯ + 1− c1 − c2))2
, (30)
which should still satisfy our initial assumption D∗12 <
1
2θ¯
.
This requires the following condition holds:
2θ¯(c1 + c2) + θ¯ > 2(θ¯
2 + λ). (31)
8(a) Low price regime p12 ≤ 1 + λD12 (b) High price regime p12 > 1 + λD12
Fig. 6: Demand analysis for hybrid pricing in the content sharing service model
The analysis for medium price regime and low price
regime is similar to the high price regime case and is given
in Appendix D. Then, we summarize our results in the three
cases as follows.
Proposition 4.1. Under bundled pricing, the optimal price
and equilibrium demand are given as follows:
• If 2θ¯(c1 + c2) + θ¯ > 2(θ¯2 + λ), the provider decides
high price p12 ∈ (θ¯+λD12, θ¯+1+λD12) in Fig. 5(a).
The equilibrium demand D∗12 and the optimal price
p∗12 are as defined in (30) and (29), respectively.
• If 2θ¯(c1 + c2) + θ¯ ≤ 2(θ¯2 + λ) and 2(θ¯2 + θ¯(c1 +
c2) + λ) ≥ 3θ¯ + 4θ¯λ, the provider decides medium
price p12 ∈ (1 + λD12, θ¯ + λD12) in Fig. 5(b). The
equilibrium demand D∗12 is
D∗12 =
θ¯ − c1 − c2 + 12
2(θ¯ − λ) , (32)
and the optimal price p∗12 is
p∗12 =
2θ¯ + 2(c1 + c2) + 1
4
. (33)
• If 2(θ¯2 + θ¯(c1 + c2) + λ) < 3θ¯ + 4θ¯λ, the provider
decides low price p12 ∈ (λD12, 1+λD12) in Fig. 5(c).
The equilibrium demand D∗12 is the unique solution
to
2
√
2θ¯λ(1−D12) 32 − (2λ− c1 − c2)
√
2θ¯
√
1−D12
− 3θ¯(1 −D12) + θ¯ = 0,
(34)
and the optimal price is
p∗12(D12) =
√
2θ¯(1−D12) + λD12. (35)
4.2 Hybrid Pricing for Content Sharing Services
Under hybrid pricing, the provider offers the device and
bundle product simultaneously, which means that the users
can buy the device only or pay additional service fee p12−p1
to buy both device and device-supported service. Given the
device prices p1 and bundle price p12, the utility of a user for
buying device only is given in (1), and the utility for buying
the bundle is given in (27).
A user will buy the device if U1 ≥ 0. Furthermore, the
user will buy the bundle if the service utility is positive, i.e.,
U12 ≥ 0 andR2+λD12 > p12−p1. Note that even if U1 < 0,
the user will still buy the bundle once R2 + λD12 is large
enough to cover the negative U1.
Since R1, R2 follow uniform distributions, the equilib-
rium demand for device only is shown as the orange rectan-
gle in Fig. 6(a) or Fig. 6(b). By calculating its area, we have
D∗1 =
(θ¯ − p1)(p12 − p1 − λD12)
θ¯
. (36)
Note that if p12−p1 > 1+λD12, no one will buy the bundle
product, which means that the provider sells device only at
price p∗1 =
θ¯+c1
2 and profit Π1 =
(θ¯−c1)2
4θ¯
.
By providing the bundle option, the equilibrium demand
D∗12 for bundle is different according to the bundle price p12.
As illustrated in Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b), we will analyze the
optimal prices (p∗1, p
∗
12) under the two cases.
(i) In low price regime (p12 ≤ 1 + λD12), the users’
bundle demand is shown as the blue polygon in Fig. 6(a).
We calculate the polygon area by subtracting the normal-
ized equal-right triangle area (of side length p1) from the
rectangle [0, θ¯]×[p12−p1, 1+λD12]. The equilibrium bundle
demand satisfies
D12 =
θ¯(1 + λD12 − (p12 − p1))− p
2
1
2
θ¯
, (37)
which uniquely provides
D∗12(p1, p12) =
1− p12 + p1 − p
2
1
2θ¯
1− λ . (38)
By substituting D∗1 and D
∗
12 above to Πh in (6), we can
show that the profit is a concave function of p12. The first-
order condition provides the optimal p∗12(p1) as a function
of p1, i.e.,
p∗12(p1) =
1 + c2
2
+
(2c1 − 3p1)p1
4θ¯
+ p1. (39)
Then, we can rewrite D∗1 , D
∗
12 and Πh as functions of p1
only:
max
p1
Πh(p1) (40)
subject to
p∗12(p1) ≤ 1 + λD∗12(p1), (41)
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Fig. 7: Comparison between bundled and hybrid pricing for different λ when
θ¯ = 1.5
p∗12(p1)− p1 − λD∗12(p1) ≥ 0, (42)
where the constraint (41) tells the low price regime. The
left-hand-side of constraint (42) is the height of the orange
rectangle in Fig. 6(a), which ensures the device-only demand
is non-zero, otherwise the hybrid pricing is the same as the
bundled pricing.
Still, the new profit objective in (40) is non-convex. As
only one decision variable is included, we can apply a one-
dimensional exhaustive search to find optimal p∗1.
(ii) In high price regime (p12 > 1 + λD12), the bundle
demand is shown as the blue trapezoid area in Fig. 6(b),
which can be calculated as
D12
=
((θ¯ − p1) + (θ¯ − p12 + 1 + λD12))(1 + λD12 − p12 + p1)
2θ¯
.
(43)
Note that (43) has two roots. Denote the larger root of
(43) as D12,1 and the smaller root as D12,2. The equilibrium
demand D12 is determined according to p1 and p12 for
maximum profit:
D∗12(p1, p12) =
{
D12,1, if p12 − c1 − c2 > λ(p1−c1)(θ¯−p1)θ¯ ;
D12,2, if p12 − c1 − c2 ≤ λ(p1−c1)(θ¯−p1)θ¯ .
By substituting D∗1 in (36) and D
∗
12 above into Πh, Πh is
just a function of p1 and p12 and the optimization problem
is
max
p1,p12
Πh(p1, p12) (44)
subject to
p12 > 1 + λD
∗
12(p1, p12), (45)
p12 − p1 − λD∗12(p1, p12) ≥ 0, (46)
where constraint (45) tells the high price regime. Note that
(44) is still a non-convex problem, and we will solve it
numerically below.
4.3 Comparison between Bundled and Hybrid Pricing
for Content Sharing Services
Recall that in Section 3.3, we show hybrid pricing strictly
dominates bundled pricing. Mathematically, bundled pric-
ing is a special case of hybrid pricing when no user buys
device only. In this subsection, we analyze when the hybrid
pricing degenerates to bundled pricing and numerically
compare the provider’s optimal profits under hybrid and
bundled pricing for more general cases which cannot be
solved in closed-form.
Proposition 4.2. As the degree of network externality λ
increases, the provider is more likely to sell the device
and service as a bundle. To be specific, when λ > 32
and 4c1+ c2 < 1, hybrid pricing degenerates to bundled
pricing.
The proof is given in Appendix E. Note that the bound
is not tight due to the non-trackable optimal prices under
hybrid pricing. As illustrated in Fig. 7, as the network
externality λ increases (from 0.85 to 0.9 and then to 0.95),
bundled pricing outperforms hybrid pricing in a larger
(c1, c2) area. As the network externality λ increases, the
service value dominates the device value, and it is better
to skip device-only option and use bundled pricing to
maximumly stimulate network externality, which results in
a higher bundled price and thus profit. Fig. 7 also shows
that the provider chooses bundled pricing only when the
total cost is small to efficiently promote the strong network
externality. If c1 or c2 is high, the provider prefers hybrid
pricing to charge differently in device and service-related
items.
According to Proposition 4.2, when the network exter-
nality λ is strong (larger than 32 ), it is better to use bundled
pricing to stimulate network externality if the total cost
of device and service is low. Hence, the service valuation
λD12 is high and thus the provider can charge a high bun-
dled price. As shown in Fig. 8, bundled pricing is equally
profitable as hybrid pricing when λ is large, i.e., hybrid
pricing degenerates to bundled pricing. This is different
from first physical connectivity sharing model, where device
and service values for indoor and outdoor WiFi usage
are related and comparable. In the virtual content sharing
model, the service value is independent of device value and
can be fairly large. On the other hand, when the maximum
device value θ¯ is large under small λ, the provider prefers
hybrid pricing to flexibly charge a high device price to
meet high device value. In this case, the bundled pricing to
maximumly promote service value will inefficiently lower
the marginal profit of device selling.
5 GENERALIZATION OF OUR MODELS AND RE-
SULTS
Our model can be extended to incorporate the correlation
modelling of device and service valuations (subadditive or
superadditive) for the content sharing service model. Other
than considering the uniform distribution, we also extend
to normal distributions for the valuations in both models in
this section.
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(a) Low price regime p12
ω
≤ 1 + λD12 (b) High price regime p12
ω
> 1 + λD12
Fig. 9: Demand analysis for hybrid pricing with correlation factor ω. The three dashlines in each subfigure are drawn according to the same function
p12−p1
ω
− (1−
1
ω
)R1 with different values of ω
Fig. 8: Comparison between bundled pricing and hybrid pricing when c1 = 0.3
and c2 = 0.1
5.1 Correlation between A User’s Device and Service
Valuations
Recall that we have assumed that users’ device and service
valuations are independent in Section 2. In reality, users’
valuations for the device and service could be subadditive
or superadditive. If the device and service are substitute, the
utility of purchasing both products for a user is subadditive;
if the device and service are complementary, the utility of
purchasing both products is superadditive. We consider the
subadditivity/superadditivity correlation properties for the
content sharing model in this subsection. Note that in the
connectivity (WiFi) sharing model, the users are either at
home or outdoor at a time, thus their device and service
valuations are linearly additive (i.e., independent) according
to time divisions.
Denote the correlation factor between the device and
service valuations for all users as ω, where ω > 1 tells the
superadditivity property and ω < 1 tells the subadditivity
property. In the bundled pricing, the utility of a user for
buying the bundle now changes from (27) to
Uω12 = ω(R1 +R2 + λD12)− p12. (47)
In the hybrid pricing, the utility of a user for buying
device only is still given in (1), and the utility for buying the
bundle is the same as (47).
Similar to the analysis in Section 4.1, according to Fig. 5,
the equilibrium demand and the analysis for bundled pricing
can be divided into three cases.
• If 2θ¯(c1+c2)
ω
+ θ¯ > 2(θ¯2 + λ), the provider de-
cides high price p∗12(D12) = ω(θ¯ + 1 + λD12 −√
2θ¯D12), and the equilibrium demand is D
∗
12 =
8(θ¯+1− c1+c2
ω
)2
(3
√
θ¯+
√
9θ¯−16λ(θ¯+1− c1+c2
ω
))2
.
• If 2θ¯(c1+c2)
ω
+ θ¯ ≤ 2(θ¯2 + λ) and 2(θ¯2 + θ¯(c1+c2)
ω
+
λ) ≥ 3θ¯ + 4θ¯λ, the provider decides medium price
p∗12 =
ω(2θ¯+1)+2(c1+c2)
4 , and the equilibrium demand
is D∗12 =
θ¯+ 1
2
− c1+c2
ω
2(θ¯−λ) .
• If 2(θ¯2+ θ¯(c1+c2)
ω
+λ) < 3θ¯+4θ¯λ, the provider decides
low price p∗12(D12) = w(
√
2θ¯(1 −D12)+λD12), and
the equilibrium demand D∗12 is the unique solution
to 2
√
2θ¯λ(1−D12) 32 − (2λ− c1+c2ω )
√
2θ¯
√
1−D12 −
3θ¯(1−D12) + θ¯ = 0.
Therefore, we can conclude the relationship between
equilibrium demand D∗12 and ω in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 5.1. The equilibrium bundled demand D∗12
increases with ω.
For the hybrid pricing, similar to the demand analy-
sis illustration in Fig. 6, we also have low price regime
(p12
ω
≤ 1 + λD12) and high price regime (p12ω > 1 + λD12).
Different from the equilibrium demand analysis for the
independent case shown in Fig. 6, here the equilibrium
demands for device only and bundled product are greatly
influenced by the correlation factor ω as shown in Fig. 9. The
division line p12−p1
ω
− (1 − 1
ω
)R1 between the bundle and
device demand regions (in blue and orange) changes with
ω, which degenerates to the flat line in Fig. 6 when ω = 1.
As ω increases, bundled demand increases and device-only
demand decreases. By calculating the orange polygon areas
11
D12 =


1
2θ¯
((2(1 + λD12 − p12ω ) + p1)p1 + (θ¯ − p1)(2(1 + λD12 − p12ω ) + (1 + 1ω )p1 + (1 − 1ω )θ¯)),
if p12
λD12+1
≤ ω < p12−p1+θ¯
λD12+θ¯
;
1
2θ¯
(2(1 + λD12 − p12ω ) + p1)p1 + θ¯−p1θ¯ − 12θ¯ (p12ω − p1 − λD12)(
p12−p1
ω
−λD12
1− 1
ω
− p1),
if p12−p1+θ¯
λD12+θ¯
≤ ω < p12
λD12+p1
;
1− (
p12
ω
−λD12)2
2θ¯
, if ω ≥ p12
λD12+p1
.
(49)
D12 =


0, if 0 ≤ ω ≤ p12
λD12+1+θ¯
;
1
2θ¯
((1 + λD12 − p12ω + p1)(p1 − p12ω + 1 + λD12) + (θ¯ − p1)(2(1 + λD12 − p12ω ) + (1 + 1ω )p1 + (1− 1ω )θ¯)),
if p12
λD12+1+θ¯
≤ ω < p12−p1+θ¯
λD12+θ¯
;
1
2θ¯
(1 + λD12 − p12ω + p1)(p1 − p12ω + 1 + λD12) + θ¯−p1θ¯ − 12θ¯ (p12ω − p1 − λD12)(
p12−p1
ω
−λD12
1− 1
ω
− p1),
if p12−p1+θ¯
λD12+θ¯
≤ ω < min( p12
λD12+p1
, p12
λD12+1
);
(θ¯−( p12
ω
−λD12))+(θ¯−( p12ω −1−λD12))
2θ¯
, if p12
λD12+p1
≤ ω ≤ p12
λD12+1
.
(50)
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Fig. 10: Comparison between bundled and hybrid pricing for different ω when
θ¯ = 1.5 and λ = 0.95
shown in Figs. 9(a) and 9(b), the equilibrium demand for the
device only changes from (36) to
D∗1 =


θ¯−p1
2θ¯
(2p12
ω
− (1 + 1
ω
)p1 − (1− 1ω )θ¯ − 2λD12),
if 0 ≤ ω < p12−p1+θ¯
λD12+θ¯
;
1
2θ¯
(p12
ω
− p1 − λD12)(
p12−p1
ω
−λD12
1− 1
ω
− p1),
if p12−p1+θ¯
λD12+θ¯
≤ ω < p12
λD12+p1
;
0, if ω ≥ p12
λD12+p1
.
(48)
Similar to the analysis in Section 4.2, the equilibrium
demand analysis for the bundle product is as follows.
• In low price regime (p12
ω
≤ 1 + λD12), by calculating
the blue polygon area shown in Fig. 9(a), the equilib-
rium bundled demand changes from (37) to (49).
• In high price regime (p12
ω
> 1+λD12), by calculating
the blue polygon area shown in Fig. 9(b), the equilib-
rium bundled demand changes from (43) to (50).
According to the equilibrium demands given in (48), (49)
and (50), given any device price p1 and bundle price p12, we
can rigorously prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2. In the hybrid pricing, the equilibrium
demand for device only D∗1(p1, p12) decreases to 0 as
the correlation factor ω increases, while the equilibrium
demand for bundle product D∗12(p1, p12) increases with
ω.
The equilibrium demands are not in closed-form and the
objective maxp1,p12 Πh(p1, p12) given in (6) is a non-convex
problem. It is difficult to theoretically analyze the optimal
hybrid pricing, and we use numerical methods by exhaus-
tively searching the optimal device and bundled prices as
in Section 4.3. Then, we compare the provider’s optimal
profits under bundled and hybrid pricing. As illustrated
in Fig. 10, hybrid pricing outperforms bundled pricing in
high (c1, c2) area, which is similar to Fig. 7. However, as
the correlation factor ω increases, hybrid pricing is more
likely to degenerate to bundled pricing. Intuitively, as ω
increases, users prefer to buy the device and service as a
bundle to increase their utilities jointly, thus it is better for
the provider to skip device-only option and use bundled
pricing to maximumly stimulate network externality.
5.2 Normal Distribution for Device and Service Valua-
tions
We extend our models to normal distributions for the device
and service valuations in both connectivity and content
sharing service models in this subsection.
5.2.1 Connectivity Sharing Service Model
Now a user’s mobility factor α ∈ [0, 1] follows a normal
distribution with mean µα ∈ (0, 1) and variance σα > 0
instead of uniform distribution assumed in Section 3. This is
a truncated normal distribution version, as the user mobility
α is bounded in [0, 1] in practice. Similar to the analysis
in Section 3, the equilibrium demand analysis for the three
pricing schemes is as follows:
• Separate pricing: The equilibrium demand for the
device changes from (10) to
D∗1(p1) =
1
Σ
(erf(
1− p1 − µα√
2σα
) + erf(
µα√
2σα
)), (51)
12
and the equilibrium demand for the service changes
from (11) to
D∗2(p1, p2) =
1
Σ
(erf(
1 − µα√
2σα
)−erf(
p2
D∗1
− µα√
2σα
)), (52)
where Σ is denoted as erf(1−µα√
2σα
) + erf( µα√
2σα
).
• Bundle pricing: If (53) below has a real root in the
region [0, 1], the equilibrium demand D∗12 ∈ [0, 1] is
the unique solution to
D12 =
1
Σ
(erf(
1−p12
1−D12 − µα√
2σα
) + erf(
µα√
2σα
)). (53)
Otherwise, D∗12 = 1.
• Hybrid pricing: The equilibrium demand for the
device changes from (24) to
D∗1(p1, p12) =
1
Σ
(erf(
p12 − p1 − µα√
2σα
) + erf(
µα√
2σα
)),
(54)
and the equilibrium demand for the bundle changes
from (25) to
D∗12(p1, p12) =
1
Σ
(erf(
1− µα√
2σα
)−erf(p12 − p1 − µα√
2σα
)).
(55)
Actually, for any continuous distribution of mobility
factor α, below we can obtain similar results as Proposition
3.3 and Theorem 3.2 for uniform distribution.
Proposition 5.3. Hybrid pricing strictly dominates bundled
pricing for any continuous distribution of α (including
the normal distribution).
The proof of Proposition 5.3 is given in Appendix F.
As hybrid pricing always outperforms bundled pricing,
we only need to compare separate pricing and hybrid pric-
ing. Note that if c1+ c2 > 1, according to (17), the users will
not buy the bundle product since their utility for buying
the bundle U12(α) < 0 due to p12 ≥ c1 + c2 > 1. Thus, the
provider will always choose separate pricing to maximize its
profit for selling device only. Then, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.4. For any continuous distribution of α, the
provider prefers to adopt separate pricing if
c1 + c2 > 1. (56)
This result is similar to Fig. 4 for uniform distribution.
When both device cost c1 and service cost c2 are high, the
provider would choose separate pricing to flexibly cease
to provide costly service and only provides device option.
However, when both costs are small, hybrid pricing domi-
nates separate pricing as it stimulates the positive network
effect.
5.2.2 Content Sharing Services
Now we turn to the content sharing model, where the
users’ device valuation R1 ∈ [0, θ¯] and service valua-
tion R2 ∈ [0, 1] follow normal distributions with mean
µ1 ∈ (0, θ¯), µ2 ∈ (0, 1) and variance σ1, σ2 > 0, respectively.
Here, we further investigate the impact of nonlinearity of
service quality function Q(D12) = D
γ
12 on the provider’s
pricing design, where γ ≤ 1 and small γ tells that the
QoS increases very quickly at the beginning and then very
slowly. Similar to the analysis in Section 4.1, according to
Fig. 5, the equilibrium demand analysis for bundled pricing
is divided into three cases.
• In high price regime (θ¯+λDγ12 < p12 < θ¯+1+λD
γ
12),
the equilibrium bundled demand (not in closed-
form) is
D12 =
1
Φ
∫ 1
p12−θ¯−λDγ12
fR2(R2)ψ(R2)dR2, (57)
where fR2(R2) =
1√
2piσ2
exp(− (R2−µ2)2
2σ2
2
),
ψ(R2) = erf(
θ¯−µ1√
2σ1
) − erf(p12−R2−λD
γ
12
−µ1√
2σ1
), Φ =
1
2
(
erf( θ¯−µ1√
2σ1
) + erf( µ1√
2σ1
)
)(
erf(1−µ2√
2σ2
) + erf( µ2√
2σ2
)
)
.
It is difficult to solve the integration and simplify
(57).
• Inmedium price regime (1+λDγ12 < p12 < θ¯+λD
γ
12),
the equilibrium bundled demand is
D12 =
1
Φ
∫ 1
0
fR2(R2)ψ(R2)dR2. (58)
• In low price regime (λDγ12 < p12 < 1 + λD
γ
12), the
equilibrium bundled demand is
D12 =
1
Φ
∫ p12−λDγ12
0
fR2(R2)ψ(R2)dR2. (59)
For the hybrid pricing, the equilibrium demand for device
only is
D1 =
1
2Φ
(
erf(
θ¯ − µ1√
2σ1
)− erf(p1 − µ1√
2σ1
)
)
×
(
erf(
p12 − p1 − λDγ12 − µ2√
2σ2
) + erf(
µ2√
2σ2
)
)
.
(60)
And the equilibrium demand analysis for the bundle prod-
uct is divided into two cases.
• In low price regime (p12 ≤ 1+λDγ12), the equilibrium
bundled demand is
D12 =
1
Φ
∫ p12−λDγ12
p12−p1−λDγ12
fR2(R2)ψ(R2)dR2. (61)
• In high price regime (p12 > 1 + λD
γ
12), the equilib-
rium bundled demand is
D12 =
1
Φ
∫ 1
p12−p1−λDγ12
fR2(R2)ψ(R2)dR2. (62)
Substitute the equilibrium demands into the provider’s
total profit under bundled pricing Πb(p12) in (5) and hybrid
pricing Πh(p1, p12) in (6), respectively, we can show that
the objectives are non-convex. Therefore, we numerically
search for the optimal prices and compare the profits under
both pricing schemes as in Section 4. Fig. 11 shows that the
provider would choose hybrid pricing for large costs regime
to charge differently in device and service-related items, and
he would choose bundled pricing for small costs area to
efficiently promote the strong network externality. This is
similar to Fig. 7. Fig. 11 also show the impact of γ, where
a smaller γ value exhibits weaker network externality and
thus the provider is less likely to choose bundled pricing.
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Fig. 11: Comparison between bundled pricing and hybrid pricing for content
sharing service under different service quality sensitivity γ when device valuation
R1 ∈ [0, θ¯] and service valuation R2 ∈ [0, 1] follow normal distribution
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has studied profit maximization for the wireless
device provider in two popular service models, namely
physical connectivity sharing and virtual content sharing
services, under three pricing strategies – separate pricing,
bundled pricing and hybrid pricing, and gives guidance
to which pricing strategy to apply. In the physical service
model where the device-owners contribute to the connectiv-
ity sharing, it is shown that bundled pricing outperforms
separate pricing as long as the total device and service
cost is reasonably low to stimulate network externality, and
hybrid pricing always dominates bundled pricing thanks
to the flexibility to keep high marginal profit of device-
selling. In the virtual sharing service model where only
service subscribers contribute to the virtual content sharing
and the network externality can be fairly strong, we show
that hybrid pricing degenerates to bundled pricing when
the network externality is larger than the average device
valuation.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1
To find the optimal prices, we substitute the equilibrium de-
vice demand D∗1(p1) in (10) and service demand D
∗
2(p1, p2)
in (11) to the provider’s profit Πs in (12) and take derivative
with respect to p1, p2, respectively. Then, we get the rela-
tionship between optimal p1 and p2 as
∂Πs
∂p1
= 1− 2p1 + c1 − p2(p2 − c2)
(1− p1)2 = 0, (63)
∂Πs
∂p2
= 1− p2
1− p1 −
p2 − c2
1− p1 = 0. (64)
Since ∂
2Πs
∂p2
2
< 0, the optimal profit Πs is concave with p2
and thus the optimal service price is p∗2 =
1+c2−p∗1
2 in (14).
If social service is provided, i.e., D∗2(p1, p2) ≥ 0, or simply
p1+ p2 ≤ 1, we require p1 ≤ 1− c2 by substituting (14) into
p1 + p
∗
2 ≤ 1.
Substitute p∗2 to (63), we have the optimal device price as
the solution to (13).
Denote the profit’s first-derivative function as f(p1) =
3
4 − 2p1 + c1 + c
2
2
4(1−p1)2 . We can see that f(p1) = 0 has at
most three roots and f(p1) satisfies f(p1 = 0) > 0, f(p1 =
1− c2) = c1+2c2−1, f(p1 = 1) = +∞ and f(p1 = +∞) =
−∞. In the following, we discuss the provider’s optimal
price design depending on the two costs.
When f(1−c2) = c1+2c2−1 < 0, as shown in Fig. 12(a),
f(p1) = 0 has three real roots, two of which are less than
1. Since only the smallest root of (13) is in the reasonable
region [0, 1− c2] (see Fig. 12(a)), we have p∗1 as the minimal
solution of (13).
When f(1 − c2) = c1 + 2c2 − 1 ≥ 0, f(p1) has two real
roots if µ ≤ 0 or no root if µ > 0 in the reasonable region
p1 ∈ [0, 1− c2], where
µ = κ2 +
(14 + 8c1
24
− (19 + 4c1)
2
576
)3
,
with
κ =− (19 + 4c1)(14 + 8c1)
384
+
(19 + 4c1
24
)3
+
c22 + 4c1 + 3
16
.
If f(p1) has two roots as shown in Fig. 12(b), the smaller one
satisfies ∂
2Πs
∂p2
1
< 0 whereas the larger one satisfies ∂
2Πs
∂p2
1
> 0.
Therefore, the provider will choose the smaller one as the
device price.
If f(p1) has no solution in the reasonable region p1 ∈
[0, 1−c2] as shown in Fig. 12(c), f(p1) > 0 always holds and
thusΠs increases with p1 in the region p1 ∈ [0, 1−c2]. When
p1 = 1− c2, p2 = c2 according to (14) and the provider can’t
gain positive profit from the service. Hence, the provider
would not provide the social service in the first place and
aims to sell the device only. The profit received by selling
the device only is
Π1(p1) = (p1 − c1)D1, (65)
where D1 is given in (10). Using the first order condition,
the provider sets p∗1 =
1+c1
2 and the resulting profit is
Π1(p
∗
1) =
(1−c1)2
4 . By comparing the optimal profits with
and without service, the provider chooses the pricing strat-
egy that optimize its profit. That is, if Πs(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) > Π1((p
∗
1),
where Πs(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) can be obtained by insert p
∗
1, p
∗
2 into (12),
the provider provides both device and service; Otherwise,
the provider sells device only.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2
We divide our bundled pricing analysis into two cases:
p12 <
3
4 and p12 ≥ 34 .
If p12 <
3
4 , (18) doesn’t have any real root and D12 <
1−p12
1−D12 always holds, which shows that, for any initial D12
value, the number of users subscribing to the service will
increase until D∗12 = 1 eventually. That is to say, all users
will subscribe to the service. As the profit Πb(p12) = p12 −
c1−c2 increases with p12, the provider would set maximum
p∗12 → 34 . This also tells the optimal bundle price should
satisfy p12 ≥ 34 .
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Fig. 12: Illustration of existence of real root in the reasonable device price region [0, 1− c2]
If p12 ≥ 34 , there are two equilibria D∗12(p12) by solving
(18), i.e.,
D∗12(p12) =
1±√4p12 − 3
2
.
In the following, we analyze the provider’s optimal bundled
pricing design under these two equilibria one by one.
• When D∗12(p12) =
1−√4p12−3
2 , we can verify that
bundle demand 1−p121−D∗
12
(p12)
≤ 1 is satisfied due to
p12 ≥ 34 . Then, the profit is a concave function of p12,
and is given by
Πb(p12) =
1−√4p12 − 3
2
(p12 − c1 − c2), (66)
The optimal bundle price p∗12 can be derived by
solving the first-order condition:
36p212−(24(c1+c2)+40)p12+(2(c1+c2)+3)2+3 = 0.
(67)
If (67) has real solution, we can obtain the optimal
profit Πb(p
∗
12) by substituting p
∗
12 into (66). If (67)
doesn’t have a real solution, the left-hand-side of (67)
is always positive, which results in ∂Πb
∂p12
< 0. Thus,
Πb(p12) decreases with p12 and p
∗
12 =
3
4 .
• When D∗12(p12) =
1+
√
4p12−3
2 , we also have bundle
demand 1−p121−D∗
12
(p12)
≤ 1 due to p12 ≥ 34 . Since the
profit
Πb(p12) =
1 +
√
4p12 − 3
2
(p12 − c1 − c2)
increases with p12, the provider would set p
∗
12 = 1 to
reach D∗12 = 1 and maximize its profit.
By comparing the optimal profits received from these
two demand equilibria, the provider chooses the bundle
price p∗12 = 1 for reaching the maximum demand D
∗
12 = 1
and the maximum profit 1− c1 − c2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.3
According to (24) and (25), to determine the equilibrium
demands D∗1 and D
∗
12, we need to compare
p12−p1
D1+D12
and
1− p1, 1−p121−D1−D12 and 1.
Consider the case when 1−p121−D1−D12 ≥ 1 and
p12−p1
D1+D12
≤
1−p1, by solving (24) and (25) jointly, the equilibrium device
demand D∗1 is
D∗1 = p12 − p1,
and the equilibrium bundle demand D∗12 is
D∗12 = 1− p12 + p1.
The total demand is D∗1 + D
∗
12 = 1 and the provider
would like to set the hybrid pricing such that all users are
involved in the market. Then, the objective of the provider
is to maximize
Πh(p1, p12) =(p1 − c1)(p12 − p1)
+ (p12 − c1 − c2)(1 − p12 + p1)
=p12 − c1 − c2 + (p12 − p1)(c2 − p12 + p1).
By taking derivative of Πh(p1, p12) over p1, we get the
relationship between optimal p∗12 and p
∗
1 as
p∗12 = p
∗
1 +
c2
2
.
By substituting it back to the profit Πh(p1, p12), we can
derive p∗1 = 1− c22 and p∗12 = 1. The corresponding demands
are D∗1 =
c2
2 and D
∗
12 = 1 − c22 . By substituting p∗12 and p∗1
to Πh(p1, p12), we obtain the optimal profit in (26).
For all other three cases, i.e., ( 1−p121−D1−D12 ≤ 1,
p12−p1
D1+D12
≤
1 − p1), or ( 1−p121−D1−D12 ≥ 1,
p12−p1
D1+D12
≥ 1 − p1), or
( 1−p121−D1−D12 ≤ 1,
p12−p1
D1+D12
≥ 1−p1), analysis follows similarly
and we can verify that the optimal prices should be set such
that
1−p∗12
1−D∗1−D∗12 = 1 and
p∗12−p∗1
D∗1+D
∗
12
= 1 − p∗1 to involve all
users in the market. Thus, all these three cases converge to
the first case and the optimal profit is (26) with the optimal
prices p∗1 = 1− c22 , p∗12 = 1.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1
In medium price regime (1 + λD12 < p12 < θ¯ + λD12 or
simply 1
2θ¯
≤ D12 ≤ 1− 12θ¯ ), the users’ subscription and their
demand are shown in Fig. 5(b). By calculating the shared
trapezoid area, the equilibrium demand can be derived from
D12 =
(θ¯ − (p12 − λD12)) + (θ¯ − (p12 − 1− λD12))
2θ¯
, (68)
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which provides
D∗12(p12) =
2θ¯ − 2p12 + 1
2θ¯ − 2λ . (69)
Substitute D∗12(p12) to profit Πb, we find Πb(p12) as a
concave function of p12. By checking the first-order condi-
tion, we obtain the equilibrium price p∗12 and the resulting
equilibrium demand D∗12 as
p∗12 =
2θ¯ + 2(c1 + c2) + 1
4
, (70)
D∗12 =
θ¯ − c1 − c2 + 12
2(θ¯ − λ) . (71)
The demand should still satisfy our initial assumption 1
2θ¯
≤
D∗12 ≤ 1− 12θ¯ in the medium price regime. That requires the
following two conditions:
2θ¯(c1 + c2) + θ¯ ≤ 2(θ¯2 + λ), (72)
and
2(θ¯2 + θ¯(c1 + c2) + λ) ≥ 3θ¯ + 4θ¯λ. (73)
In low price regime (λD12 < p12 < 1 + λD12 or simply
D12 > 1− 12θ¯ ), the users’ subscription and their demand are
shown in Fig. 5(c). Calculate the shared area by subtracting
the normalized equal-right triangle’s area (of side length
p12−λD12) from 1, the equilibrium demand can be derived
from
D12 = 1− (p12 − λD12)
2
2θ¯
. (74)
From (74), we can show p12 as a unique function of
demand D12, that is
p∗12(D12) =
√
2θ¯(1−D12) + λD12. (75)
Substitute it to profit Πb, the provider’s optimization prob-
lem in Stage I is
max
D12
Πb(D12) = (
√
2θ¯(1−D12) + λD12 − c1 − c2)D12.
By checking the first-order condition, we have the equi-
librium demand D∗12 as the solution to
2
√
2θ¯λ(1 −D12) 32 − (2λ− c1 − c2)
√
2θ¯
√
1−D12
− 3θ¯(1−D12) + θ¯ = 0.
(76)
We can show that there is a unique solution to (76),
satisfying assumptionD∗12 ∈ (1− 12θ¯ , 1] under the following
condition:
2(θ¯2 + θ¯(c1 + c2) + λ) < 3θ¯ + 4θ¯λ. (77)
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.2
As explained for hybrid pricing in Section 4.2, we require
that constraint (42) holds for non-zero device-only demand.
Additionally, p12 − p1 ≤ 1 + λD12 should hold for non-
zero bundle demand. Thus, we have λD12 ≤ p12 − p1 ≤
1+λD12. Given this feasible range of p12−p1, we introduce
a new decision variable σ ∈ [0, 1] such that p12 = p1 + σ +
λD12. We can also rewrite device-only demand in (36) as
D∗1 =
(θ¯−p1)σ
θ¯
, where p1 ∈ [0, θ¯] and D∗1 is independent of
λ. Provided with p12 = p1+ σ+ λD
∗
12, the provider’s profit
under hybrid pricing is
Πh = (p1 + σ + λD12 − c1 − c2)D12 + (p1 − c1)D1. (78)
Note that p1 ≤ θ¯, we have
∂Πh
∂σ
∂λ
< 0 for the two cases
p12 ≤ 1 + λD12 and p12 > 1 + λD12 shown in Fig. 6.
Thus, ∂Πh
∂σ
decreases with λ, which means for any given
c1, c2 and θ¯,
∂Πh
∂σ
changes from positive to negative as λ
increases. As σ decreases, hybrid pricing degenerates to
bundled pricing (see Fig. 6). Thus, when ∂Πh
∂σ
is negative, the
provider receives the optimal profit under bundled pricing.
Therefore, we can conclude that the provider is more likely
to sell the device and service as a bundle as λ increases.
In the following, we will discuss the condition when the
bundled pricing outperforms the hybrid pricing for the two
cases shown in Fig. 6.
When p12 ≤ 1 + λD12, i.e., σ + p1 ≤ 1, the equilibrium
bundle demand is
D∗12 =
θ¯(1− σ)− p212
θ¯
.
Substitute D∗1 and D
∗
12 into Πh, we have
∂Πh
∂σ
as a
concave function of p1. Insert the optimal p
∗
1 into
∂Πh
∂σ
, we
can check that
∂Πh(p
∗
1)
∂σ
< 0 when λ > 32 and c2 < 1.
Therefore, the provider’s profit Πh reaches its maximum
when σ = 0, which means D∗1 = 0. That is, if λ >
3
2 and
c2 < 1, the hybrid pricing degenerates to bundled pricing
when p12 ≤ 1 + λD12 (see Fig. 6(a)).
When p12 > 1 + λD12, i.e., σ + p1 > 1, the equilibrium
bundle demand is
D∗12 =
(2θ¯ − 2p1 + 1− σ)(1 − σ)
2θ¯
.
Similarly, we can check that ∂Πh
∂σ
is concave with p1.
Insert the optimal p∗1 into
∂Πh
∂σ
and then we have
∂Πh(p
∗
1)
∂σ
< 0
always holds when 4c1 + c2 < 1. That is, smaller σ leads to
larger profit. As shown in Fig. 6(b), when p12− p1 decreases
until σ = 0 if p12 ≤ θ¯ + λD12 or p1 = θ¯ if p12 > θ¯ + λD12,
the hybrid pricing degenerates to bundled pricing.
In conclusion, when λ > 32 and 4c1 + c2 < 1, the hybrid
pricing degenerates to bundled pricing.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.3
Note that hybrid pricing degenerates to bundled pricing if
the optimal device price p∗1 = p12 for any given bundled
price p12. This tells that device-only price is unreasonably
high and no user will choose it, as bundle option at the
same price provides higher utility. We only need to prove
that for any given p12, the provider will not set p1 equal
to p12, or simply
∂Πh
∂p1
|p1=p12 < 0. For any continuous
distribution of α with pdf fα, Lemma 3.2 still holds. Under
hybrid pricing, the equilibrium demand for device only is
D∗1 =
∫ p12−p1
0 fα(α)dα and the equilibrium demand for
bundled product is D∗12 =
∫ 1
p12−p1 fα(α)dα. By substitut-
ing such equilibrium demands into Πh in (6), we have
∂Πh
∂p1
|p1=p12 = −c2fα(0) < 0. Thus, the provider will lower
the device-only price and always choose hybrid pricing
rather than bundled pricing.
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